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Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing 
Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration? 
 
Introduction 
In the last 15 years, developing nations have signed over 1500 bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) in an effort to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
creating a more stable and transparent investment environment for foreign investors. 
BITs provide foreign investors with powerful new rights to protect their investments 
against expropriation and other forms of discrimination and the ability to sue 
governments directly through a form of dispute settlement known as investment treaty 
arbitration.  The last 5 years have seen an explosion in the number of investment treaty 
arbitration claims filed against developing nations, challenging a wide array of sensitive 
government regulations and routinely seeking millions and even billions of dollars in 
damages.1 Mounting an effective defense to these claims is essential for a developing 
nation, as even a single adverse award could wreak havoc on its economy, weaken its 
capacity to regulate in the public interest, and damage its reputation as a desirable 
investment location.   
While the number of investor claims is growing, there are new concerns over how 
well-prepared developing nations are to cope with the challenge of litigating these claims.   
 
1 See Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard: Treaty Disputes, Focus Eur., Summer 2005, available 
at: http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/treaty0605.html. This survey documents 59 investment 
treaty arbitrations with stakes of at least $100 million and 18 over $1 billion.  A sampling of these claims 
include: 1) France Telecom’s $2.9 billion claim against Lebanon over its contract to build and operate 
Lebanese mobile phone network; 2) A Canadian mining company’s $1 billion claim against Venezuela for 
the expropriation of its gold mine; 3) Multiple claims relating to Argentina’s currency crisis collectively 
worth tens of billions of dollars; 4) U.S. cellular communications company Motorola’s $2 billion claim 
against the Republic of Turkey over its investment in a Turkish mobile phone system; 5) A German 
consortium’s $500 million claim against the Philippines over the termination of a concession to build a new 
airport terminal.  
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Investment treaty arbitration is a complex form of litigation that demands much in the 
way of resources and legal expertise.  Due to financial and administrative barriers, many 
developing nations do not have the legal expertise within their government service to 
defend investment treaty claims.  As a consequence, most are forced to hire one of a 
handful of international law firms who charge the same premium market rates that 
wealthy individual investors and corporations pay for their services.  Meanwhile, 
developing nations who cannot hire outside counsel face scattered and incomplete 
sources of legal authority, uncertainty over the meaning of key BIT provisions, and no 
organized legal assistance from the international community.  Unfortunately, these 
concerns are far from theoretical: in interviews done for this article, 2 developing nation 
lawyers report not having access to fundamental sources of law and arbitration doctrine, 
or having to go to extraordinary lengths to obtain it. 
This Article argues that developing nations’ lack of affordable access to legal 
authority and expertise threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the investment treaty 
arbitration process.  Part I reviews the history, significance, and content of the BIT, the 
international agreement largely responsible for providing foreign investors with powerful 
new rights.  Part II looks at the rise of investment treaty arbitration, the actual arbitration 
process, and its impact on developing nations.  Part III examines the serious barriers to 
the effective participation of developing nations in investment treaty arbitration.  Part IV 
investigates how these barriers operate in practice, through two case studies based on 
interviews with current and former developing nation officials who have litigated 
investor-State arbitration cases.  Finally, Part V argues for the creation of a legal 
assistance center, modeled on a similar effort at the WTO, to ensure that developing 
 
2 See Part IV, infra.
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nations have access to the legal authority and expertise necessary to mount a competent 
defense to investment treaty arbitration claims.   
I. The Bilateral Investment Treaty Movement 
Over the last three decades, international investment law has undergone a 
remarkable amount of change.  From the perspective of the foreign investor, international 
investment law now offers far more legal protection against expropriation and other 
forms of discrimination at the hands of a host State than in the 1970s.3 The primary tool 
effecting this change is the bilateral investment treaty (BIT), an agreement between two 
countries that creates rules to govern investments made by the nationals of one country 
into the territory of the other.  This part will examine the origins of the BIT, its 
development, and the set of rights it provides foreign investors.   
A. Origins of the BIT Movement 
The origins of the BIT lie in the post-World War II efforts by capital-exporting 
States, chiefly the United States and European nations, to create a more rigorous 
international law of investment to protect the rapidly expanding investments of their 
companies and nationals abroad.4 Even as foreign direct investment began to take off in 
the period following World War II, foreign investors who sought the protection of 
international law found only scattered treaty provisions and contested principles5 of 
 
3 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Do BITS Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Grand Bargain, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 67, 70 (2005) [hereinafter Salacuse] 
4 Id. at 70-71. 
5 As late as the 1970’s, for example, many Latin American nations held the view – known as the “Calvo 
doctrine” – that States were only required to provide aliens the same treatment they gave to nationals.  This 
was in direct conflict with the view of most developed nations – generally accepted today -- that a breach 
international law can arise if a State does not respect the “minimum standard of protection” under 
customary international law with regard to the treatment of foreign investors.  See U.N. Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 (1998), p. 3.  [hereinafter UNCTAD, BITs in the Mid-1990s] 
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customary international law.6 Without the protection of international law, investors had 
no assurances that a host State would not unilaterally change the terms of an investment 
contract or laws and regulations affecting the investment.7 At the same time, 
international law offered foreign investors no effective enforcement mechanism to 
challenge host States that injured or expropriated their investments.  Recourse to the host 
state’s courts was not considered adequate, as they may not be sufficiently impartial to 
adjudicate a claim against their own government.8 The only other option for aggrieved 
foreign investors was to seek “diplomatic protection” by persuading their home 
government to espouse their claim against the host state at the International Court of 
Justice.9 However, this process is by its nature more political than legal and is available 
only at the discretion of an investor’s home State.10 
Given the shortcomings of the customary international law, the United States and 
other capital-exporting nations turned to signing investment treaties to provide a source 
of clear and certain rules on foreign investment.  The treaty movement began with 
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCNs), agreements that addressed 
numerous subjects beyond investment including trade, maritime, and consular relations.11 
Despite containing some protections for investment, FCNs soon fell out of favor, as they 
contained only limited commitments and did not provide investors with the ability to 
initiate a claim directly against a host State.12 
6 See Salacuse, supra note 3 at 68-70. 
7 Id. 
8 See UNCTAD, ICSID Dispute Settlement, Module 2.2: Selecting the Appropriate Forum, p. 10, at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add1_en.pdf 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 David R. Adair, Investors’ Rights: The Evolutionary Process of Investment Treaties, 6 Tulsa J. Comp. & 
Int’l L. 195, 196-97 (1999) 
12 Id. 
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With the failure of several early efforts to create a multilateral international treaty 
on foreign investment,13 the United States and Europe turned to negotiating BITs with 
individual developing nations.14 Unlike FCNs, BITs were focused solely on protecting 
FDI and contained an effective dispute resolution mechanism.  Since the signing of the 
first BIT in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan, nearly 2400 BITs have been signed by 
over 175 nations, making it the most popular international agreement for protecting 
foreign direct investment.15 Initially, the vast majority of BITs were concluded between 
a developed and developing nation.16 However, developing nations are increasingly 
signing BITs with one another,17 reflecting the emergence of some developing nation 
firms as major regional and global investors.18 In addition to BITs, there are a handful of 
regional investment agreements that are part of wider trade and investment agreements 
like NAFTA and MERCOSUR.  For all practical purposes, the increasingly dense 
network of BITs and regional agreements has displaced customary international law as 
the primary source of international law in the area of foreign investment.19 
13 See Salacuse, supra note 3, at 71-72 (discussing the failure of various multilateral efforts to create an 
international investment law treaty); International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD), Investment 
and Sustainable Development: A Guide to the Use and Potential of International Investment Agreements, p. 
21-25 (surveying failed attempts at negotiating multilateral agreements on investment) [hereinafter IISD 
Guide]. 
14 Salacuse, supra note 3, p. 72-75.   
15 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and International 
Perspectives, p. 89. [hereinafter UNCTAD, 2003 World Investment Report] Available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2003ch3_en.pdf 
16 Id.   
17 The largest percentage of total BITs signed during 2004 were between developing nations (37 percent), 
followed closely by BITs between developed and developing nations (35 percent).  BITs between 
developing nations now account for 25 percent of total BITs concluded.  See UNCTAD, Recent 
Developments in International Investment Agreements, Research Note, August (2005) at 3 [hereinafter 
UNCTAD, Recent Developments] at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs//webiteiit20051_en.pdf 
18 Id. at 4.   
19 See UNCTAD, BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 5, at 4.  
Eric J. Gottwald Leveling the Playing Field Final Draft 
 6 
As net capital-exporters, developed nations sign investment treaties primarily to 
protect the investments of their nationals and companies abroad.  Developing nations, 
meanwhile, sign investment treaties in an effort to promote foreign direct investment 
(FDI).20 The basic assumption behind an investment treaty is that the existence of a 
treaty with clear, enforceable rules will attract more FDI by offering a more stable 
investment environment.21 With the decline in lending from commercial banks and 
official aid programs during 1980s and 1990s, FDI has become the most important source 
of external capital for developing nations,22 offering a host of potential benefits, including 
job creation, technology transfers, and integration into global networks of production.23 
However, by signing a BIT a developing nation assumes obligations that may 
prove costly in the future.  As net-importers of capital, developing countries bear most of 
the risk of investor litigation inherent in signing a BIT.  Moreover, BIT obligations can 
lead to a loss of “national policy space” for host States by creating legal obstacles to its 
ability to change key economic and regulatory policies in the future.24 Hence, when 
deciding whether or not to sign a BIT developing nations must carefully weigh the 
 
20 See UNCTAD, 2003 World Investment Report, supra note 15, at 85. The extent to which BITs actually 
attract increased flows of FDI is not clear.  See Mary Hallward Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Attract FDI? Only a bit…and they could bite, World Bank Working Paper No. 3121, June 2003 at 
http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_03091
104060047/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (finding little evidence from 20 year study of FDI flows from 
OECD to developing nations that BITs stimulate additional investment); But see Salacuse, supra note 3, at 
111. (finding that BITs have a particularly strong effect on encouraging FDI to developing nations).   
21 See Salacuse, supra note 3, at 77.  
22 See UNCTAD, 2003 World Investment Report, supra note 15, at 85.   
23 However, the potential benefits from FDI are far from automatic.  In order to maximize the benefits of 
FDI, developing nations must create the right domestic policy environment, including maintaining a skilled 
workforce and sound infrastructure that allows them to become suppliers to the foreign enterprise.  See 
UNCTAD, 2003 World Investment Report, supra note 15, at 87-88.   
24 Id. at 145-6.    
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potential benefits of increased FDI against the increased exposure to litigation from 
investors.25 
B. How do BITs protect investment?  
Bilateral investment treaties contain two key innovations that make them a 
popular investment promotion device.  First, they provide investors with a clear set of 
investment protection standards that have the status of international law.  Second, they 
offer investors direct access to a binding, neutral form of investment dispute resolution to 
enforce their treaty rights.  Together, these innovations operate to restrain host state 
government in how they treat foreign investors and investments.    
There is substantial uniformity in the core content of most BITs.26 Virtually all 
BITs address four substantive areas: the scope and definition of foreign investment, 
admission and establishment, standards of treatment during the post-establishment phase, 
compensation in the event of expropriation, and dispute settlement.27 BIT standards of 
treatment can be broken down into specific standards that address discrete issues and 
general standards that apply to all aspects of a foreign investment.  Specific standards 
frequently address issues like the right to transfer capital out of the host state, 
performance requirements, and the employment of foreign personnel.28 For conceptual 
clarity, the general treatment standards can be further classified as creating either 
absolute or relative standards for host state conduct.29 Absolute standards compare the 
host state’s conduct against an external minimum standard usually drawn from customary 
 
25 See UNCTAD, BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 5, at 7.   
26 UNCTAD, 2003 World Investment Report, supra note 15, at 89.   
27 Id.  
28 See e.g. United States Trade Representative (USTR), Updated U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(Feb. 5, 2004), Arts. 7-9, [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT] at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf 
29 For a comprehensive overview of both the absolute and relative standards common in BITs, see 
UNCTAD, BITs in the Mid-1990s, supra note 5, at 53-65.   
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international law.  These include protection from unlawful expropriation and the 
requirements that States provide investors with “fair and equitable treatment,” “full 
protection and security,” and treatment consistent with international customary law.30 
Relative standards, on the other hand, measure host state conduct by reference to how it 
treats other groups of similarly situated investors.  These include national treatment,31 
which requires host governments to treat foreign investors no worse than their own 
nationals, and most favored nation (MFN),32 which requires states to provide the highest 
level of treatment offered to the investors of any third-state.   
Of course, the substantive rights and standards contained in investment treaties 
mean nothing if investors cannot effectively enforce them.  One of the principal goals of 
the investment treaty movement was to provide investors with the means to effectively 
enforce their treaty rights.   
II. Investment Treaty Arbitration and Developing Nations 
 With the proliferation of BITs, an increasing percentage of global FDI is 
protected by one or more investment treaties and foreign investors have more 
opportunities to sue governments.  This part considers investment treaty arbitration as an 
innovative form of dispute settlement, the recent sharp rise in investor claims, the actual 
treaty arbitration process, and the impact of investment treaty arbitration on developing 
nations.   
A. The Rise of Investment Treaty Arbitration 
30 See e.g. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 28, at Art. 5.   
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf 
31 Id. at Art. 3.   
32 Id. at Art. 4.   
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Prior to the advent of investment treaty arbitration, investors had very limited 
options for redressing violations of international law that negatively impacted their 
investments.   Since investors had no standing under customary international law to bring 
a claim directly against a state, their only recourse was to pursue the matter within the 
host nation’s courts or attempt to persuade their own government to espouse their claim 
directly with the host government.33 
In order to address these limitations, investment treaties contain an investor-State 
arbitration clause which allows investors to sue States directly to enforce their treaty 
rights.34 In essence, the arbitration clause serves as a standing unilateral offer by a State 
to arbitrate any claims arising out of investments made by the nationals of the other State 
party to the treaty.35 Investors “accept” this offer by initiating arbitration under the 
relevant arbitration rules.36 This means that foreign investors can directly enforce treaty 
rights without first having to convince a government bureaucracy to espouse their claim 
and avoid the risk of their dispute getting swallowed by a larger foreign policy 
dialogue.37 The significance of this innovation in dispute settlement should not be 
overlooked.  At the World Trade Organization, by way of comparison, only States have a 
cause of action against other States for violations of trade law.38 This mechanism 
 
33 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.  
34 An investor-state arbitration clause became virtually a standard BIT provision during the 1980s and 
1990s, the period when the vast majority of BITs were negotiated.  See UNCTAD, BITs in the Mid-1990s,
supra note 5, at 94. 
35 Jan Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, 10 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Investment L.J. 232 (1995) 
36 Id. 
37 Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 1538 (2005) [hereinafter 
Franck, Legitimacy Crisis].   
38 See e.g. Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the 
WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 2275, 2277 (1997).   
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provides investment treaties with a practical significance by allowing investors to enforce 
their treaty rights by initiating compulsory arbitration with a binding, enforceable award.  
Investors are increasingly initiating arbitration to redress alleged violations of 
investment treaty rights by host governments.  The number of investment treaty 
arbitration disputes filed at the World Bank Group’s International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and other arbitration fora has exploded in recent years:  
As of November 2005, the cumulative number of known claims reached 219, compared 
with just 75 in 2000.39 The vast majority of these arbitrations have been either 
administered by ICSID or held on an ad-hoc basis under the UNCITRAL rules.40 
The rise in investment treaty claims can be attributed to several factors.  With the 
long-term rise in FDI and the increasingly dense network of BITs, there are simply more 
opportunities for disputes to arise that are covered by an investment treaty.  As news of 
some of the larger successful arbitration awards spreads, more investors may be 
encouraged to utilize investment treaty arbitration clauses.41 Arbitration practitioners 
predict the volume of claims to continue to grow as investors and lawyers become more 
aware of the rights contained in BITs and other investment treaties.42 Indeed, many 
lawyers already advise investors on how to structure their investments to take advantage 
of one or even multiple investment treaties.43 
B. Overview of the Arbitration Process 
 
39 UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Monitor No. 4 (2005), p. 1  
[hereinafter UNCTAD, Latest Developments] available at:
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiit20052_en.pdf  
40 Of the 219 known investment treaty claims, 132 have been administered by ICSID, 65 under the 
UNCITRAL Rules, and only 22 under other arbitration rules.  Id. at 2. 
41 Id. at 3.  
42 See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 37, at 1538-39.   
43 Id. at 1535.   
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At the outset of a dispute, most investment treaties present investors with a choice 
between litigating in the host state’s courts or some form of investment treaty arbitration.  
Given their concern with getting a fair hearing, investors invariably choose to arbitrate 
the dispute.44 Most investment treaties provide investors with a choice between 
arbitration administered by the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes or ad-hoc arbitration under the United Nations Commission for 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules.45 There are important 
differences between these two forms of arbitration with regard to the transparency and 
supervision of the proceedings.  As an institution specifically designed to handle 
investor-state disputes, ICSID offers facilities to conduct the arbitration proceedings and 
support during the proceedings from its staff.46 Ad-hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
rules, on the other hand, takes place on a de-localized and unsupervised basis.  Investors 
sometimes prefer ad-hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules because it offers more 
flexibility to structure the proceedings, enhanced privacy, and the possibility of interim 
damages.47 
The arbitration process begins when a foreign investor files a claim with one of 
the arbitration facilities designated in the investment treaty.  Both parties then participate 
in the selection of the arbitration tribunal, with each party selecting one arbitrator and 
jointly appointing a third to serve as chairman.48 From there, the exact order of the 
 
44 Id. at 1542.   
45 See Aspasia A. Paroutsas, Claudia T. Solomon & George M. von Mehren, Navigating through Investor-
State Arbitrations – An Overview of Bilateral Investment Treaty Claims, 59 APR Disp. Resol. J. 69, 70 
(2003).   
46 See UNCTAD, Course on ICSID Dispute Settlement, Module 2.2: Selecting the Appropriate Forum, p. 
15-18, at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add1_en.pdf 
47 See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 33, at 1548-9 (notes and accompanying text).     
48 Id. at 1543.  
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process will depend on the relevant arbitration rules and the parties’ preferences.49 
Typically, the parties submit memorials setting out their case, exchange evidence, make 
further written submissions, debate issues of law and fact during oral hearings, and the 
tribunal ultimately issues an award.50 The written submissions are generally the most 
influential part of the record and tribunals place a premium on well-researched, 
organized, and clear pleadings.51 The oral hearings are comparatively short and primarily 
offer an opportunity to present witnesses and respond to the arbitrators’ main concerns.52 
Opportunities to challenge tribunal awards are very limited: the investment treaty 
arbitration system has no appellate review and there are very limited grounds for 
annulment.53 
C. The Impact of Investment Treaty Arbitration on Developing Nations 
As net importers of global capital, developing nations have borne the brunt of the 
burden of defending the growing number of investment treaty claims.  According to 
UNCTAD data, nearly two-thirds of the 219 known investment treaty claims have been 
filed against developing nation governments.54 37 different developing nations are 
known to have been defendants in investment treaty arbitration, with several facing 
 
49 At the outset of the dispute, the parties and the tribunal chairman generally hold a procedural meeting 
where the parties have broad flexibility to determine the format of the proceedings, including the timing 
and number of pleadings and whether to dispense with oral hearings.  See, e.g., International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules, Rule 20 [hereinafter ICSID 
Rules] at www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partDhtm 
50 Frank, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 37, at 1544-5.   
51 Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson & Nigel Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitration, 83-84, Kluwer Law 
International (2004).    
52 Id. 
53 A party’s options for challenging an award after vary depending on whether it was rendered under ICSID 
Convention or under another set of arbitration rules.  However, none of the available methods generally 
permit review of the merits or correction of legal errors.  Instead, opportunities for annulment are generally 
limited to a handful of procedural deficiencies.  See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 37, at 1545-
1557.   
54 See UNCTAD, Latest Developments, supra note 39, at 9-10.     
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multiple claims.55 Argentina has faced an incredible 42 claims, with Mexico a distant 
second at 17.  Developing nations’ experience with investment treaty arbitration is almost 
exclusively as defendants: there are only 11 known instances where developing nation 
firms have filed investment treaty claims.56 Due to the confidentiality surrounding non-
ICSID arbitrations, the actual number of claims against developing nations is likely to be 
significantly higher.57 
Defending investment treaty arbitration claims poses a number of challenges for 
developing nations, including the cost of litigation, the possibility of a large adverse 
award, and even new limitations on its freedom to implement government policies 
deemed inconsistent with treaty obligations.  While information on the size of investor 
claims is often sporadic, some of the known awards against developing nations involve 
substantial sums.  For example, the Czech Republic was ordered to pay $270 million plus 
substantial interest to a Dutch-based broadcasting firm after the tribunal found the media 
regulatory authorities had violated the terms of the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT.58 
In 2002, Ecuador was ordered to pay $71 million to Occidental, a U.S.-based energy 
company, after a tribunal found an administrative change in its tax code violated the 
U.S.-Ecuador BIT.59 More recently, an ICSID tribunal awarded a U.S. energy company 
 
55 Id. at 3.   
56 See UNCTAD, Investor-State disputes and policy implications, Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 
January 14, 2005, at 4. [hereinfter UNCTAD, Policy Implications] Available at:  
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2d62_en.pdf 
57 UNCTAD, Latest Developments, supra note 39, at 3.   
58 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, March 14, 2003.  Available at: 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003-Final_001.pdf 
59 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador, LCIA Case Number UN3467, Final 
Award, July 1, 2004.  Available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinalAward_001.pdf 
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$133 million in 2005 after finding Argentina in breach of the BIT as a result of measures 
taken by the Argentine Government in response to that country’s financial crisis.60 
The wave of investor lawsuits has far-reaching implications for developing 
nations’ freedom to regulate in the public interest.  Investors have turned to investment 
treaty arbitration to challenge a wide variety of government measures in a number of 
sensitive areas, including the provision of water, electricity, waste disposal, and 
sanitation services to the public.  In at least nine cases, foreign investors who have been 
awarded concession contracts to provide water and sewage services in developing 
countries have run into conflict with state and local regulatory authorities and filed 
investment treaty claims to resolve their differences.61 Other treaty-based investor 
lawsuits have challenged the denial of a permit to operate a waste disposal facility,62 the 
decision of the tax authorities regarding a value-added tax formula,63 the revocation of a 
permit to operate an industrial factory near protected wetlands,64 and the licensing of 
cellular telecommunications.65 
III. The Case for Reform: Ensuring the Full Participation of Developing Nations in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration 
 
Given that the vast majority of investment treaty claims are filed against 
developing nations, it is critical that they be able to actively participate in the dispute 
 
60 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Final Award, 
May 12, 2005.  Available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CMS_FinalAward_000.pdf 
61 Luke Eric Peterson, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Development Policy-Making, November, 2004, p. 16, [hereinafter Peterson, BITs and Policy-Making] 
at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade_bits.pdf 
62 See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, May 
29, 2003, Award.  Available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Tecnicas_001.pdf 
63 See Occidental v. Ecuador, supra note 59.   
64 See Lucchetti S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Republic of Peru, Case No. ARB/03/14), Award on 
Jurisdiction, February 7, 2005.  Available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/luchetti.pdf 
65 See Press Release, France Telecom, Award of the Arbitration Tribunal on the dispute with the Republic 
of Lebanon, (Feb. 22, 2005).  Available at:  
http://www.francetelecom.com/en/financials/journalists/press_releases/CP_old/cp050222.html  
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settlement process.  In reality, developing nations face a network of barriers that 
discourage their full participation in the treaty arbitration process.  This section examines 
three barriers to the effective participation of developing nations in the treaty arbitration 
process: a lack of affordable access to legal expertise, a lack of transparency in the 
arbitration process, and uncertainty over the meaning of key treaty rights.   
A. Access to Legal Expertise  
In any form of litigation, the level of expertise possessed by a party’s lawyers will 
likely be a decisive factor in the outcome of the dispute.  The importance of having 
access to legal expertise is only magnified in a specialized area of the law like investment 
treaty arbitration with which most lawyers have little familiarity.  Expertise in this field is 
generally limited to a close-knit community of lawyers and arbitrators who work for one 
of a handful of major international law firms with specialty practices in this area.66 
Hiring one of these firms offers a number of significant advantages: First, lawyers in 
these firms litigate investment treaty arbitration cases more frequently than other parties, 
gaining valuable experience and professional contacts in the process.  Second, the firm 
offers significant “institutional memory” with regard to past arbitration awards, the 
relevant arbitration rules, arbitrator selection, and general litigation tactics.67 Some 
partners and lawyers in the major international firms have served as arbitrators in other 
 
66 Some of the major global law firms with specialty practices in this field include: Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer (Paris), Allen & Overy (London), White & Case (Washington DC), and Covington & Burling 
(Washington DC).    
67 See, e.g., The Arbitration Practice web-site of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, a leading international 
firm for investor-state arbitration: “Our international arbitration practice consists of over 80 practitioners 
worldwide with an unrivalled track record of conducting international arbitrations under all major 
institutional rules to the highest professional standards, no matter where or under what law or language - 
from French to Mandarin - they are conducted…Our arbitration practice is also at the vanguard in 
representing private investors and governments in arbitrations under bilateral investment treaties.” 
Available at: http://www.freshfields.com/practice/arbitration/en.asp 
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cases, providing unique insight into the process.68 Knowledge gained from participating 
in past arbitrations, including those that go unpublished or settle before an award, can 
provide extra leverage in persuading governments—particularly those with minimal 
experience in the arbitration process – to settle investor claims.69 Lastly, a firm will have 
the best possible access to both published and unpublished sources of legal authority via 
in-house law libraries, support staff, and informal professional networks.   
The foreign investors who initiate investment treaty arbitration claims invariably 
hire one of the major international law firms with specialty practices in investment treaty 
arbitration.70 Developed nations tend to have the resources and legal expertise in their 
government ministries to ably defend themselves in investment treaty arbitration.71 Due 
to a lack of expertise and resources within their own government service, many 
developing nations are forced to hire outside counsel to defend investment treaty claims.   
These firms may demand fees matching those charged to their other clients, including 
private corporations, wealthy individual investors, and more prosperous governments.  
Hourly rates for these elite firms can range from $400-$600 or more an hour per lawyer.72 
Considering a claim is likely to be handled by a team of lawyers and the arbitration 
 
68 See, e.g., The International Arbitration practice web-site of Covington & Burling: “Our lawyers also 
frequently serve as arbitrators, either on an ad hoc basis or pursuant to their recognition by leading 
institutions as qualified tribunal members. For example, three of our lawyers have been appointed by 
Presidents of the United States to the ICSID Panels of Arbitrators and Conciliators O appointments that 
mirror the fact that we have handled investor-state disputes under many of the bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) in force in the world today.”  Available at: http://www.cov.com/practices/oid14787/description.html  
69 See Peterson, BITs and Policy-Making, supra note 61, at 26. 
70 In an informal review of the 79 arbitration awards posted on the Investment Treaty Arbitration web-site, 
the investor claimaint was always represented by outside counsel.  Available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ 
71 For example, the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and Investment Disputes 
is the largest department within the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Legal Adviser, which is 
comprised of approximately 130 permanent attorneys and about 70 support staff.  The United States has 
faced nine different investment treaty arbitration claims brought under NAFTA’s investment chapter, but 
has not lost a claim to date.  See “Practicing Law in the Office of the Legal Advisor”, U.S. Department of 
State Office of the Legal Advisor web-site, available at: http://www.state.gov/s/l/3190.htm. 
 
72 See infra note 109.   
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process frequently takes 2 or more years to complete, the legal bill can be staggering.  
One study found that average legal costs for governments range between $1 to 2 million 
per year.73 Meanwhile, the average cost for hiring a 3 judge panel of arbitrators runs 
$400,000 or more.74 The Czech Republic is reported to have spent $10 million to defend 
against two treaty claims related to the regulation of its media sector.75 More recently, 
the Czech Republic announced it would spend $3.3 million in 2004 and $13.8 million in 
2005 to defend against more than a half-dozen investor claims.76 Clearly, the cost of 
treaty arbitration is beyond the means of many developing nations, particularly the Least-
Developed Countries (LDCs).  A group of developing nations has already raised this 
concern to the ICSID Secretariat, suggesting the development of a fund to offset part of 
the cost of using the ICSID facility for qualified developing nations.77 
Not all developing nations hire outside counsel, whether for financial or tactical 
reasons.  This may mean that the task of defending an investment treaty claim falls to 
government attorneys without the experience or resources to mount a vigorous defense.  
In some cases, this can lead to shocking disparities in the quality of legal representation 
between investor claimants and developing nation defendants.  For example, the 
Seychelles’ Attorney General, who had no prior experience with investor-State 
 
73 UNCTAD, Policy Implications, supra note 56, at para. 14.   
74 In 2005, ICSID increased the daily fee payable to ICSID arbitrators from $2,000 to $3,000.  This figure 
is exclusive of additional costs for travel, meals, lodging, and administrative expenses.  See ICSID 
Schedule of Fees at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/schedule/fees.pdf  
75 Luke Eric Peterson, “Czech Republic hit with massive compensation bill in investment treaty dispute,” 
INVEST-SD News Bulletin, March 21, 2003, at:
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_investsd_march_2003.pdf 
76 Luke Eric Peterson, “Croatian firm invokes investment treaty to challenge Czech eviction notice,” 
INVEST-SD News Bulletin, Oct. 1, 2004, at:
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_investsd_oct1_2004.pdf 
77 South Centre, Analytical Note, Developments for Discussions for the Improvement of the Framework for 
ICSID Arbitration and the Participation of Developing Countries, February 2005, para. 43-44. [hereinafter 
South Centre] at: 
http://www.southcentre.org/tadp_webpage/research_papers/investment_project/icsid_discpaper_feb05.doc 
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arbitration, reports defending a recent ICSID claim without access to a reliable internet 
connection, Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis, or basic treatises on ICSID or investment 
arbitration.78 Likewise, when Argentina first began defending investment treaty claims, 
the Solicitor General’s office did not have access to fundamental substantive law or 
arbitration doctrine.79 During its first investment treaty cases, Argentina’s attorneys had 
to fly to Washington DC ahead of ICSID arbitration hearings to conduct the necessary 
legal research and even spent their own money to buy copies of key arbitration treatises.80 
Over the course of time, some developing nations have been able to build up 
considerable expertise in defending against investment treaty arbitration claims.  
Argentina, for example, has defended many of the claims filed against them without 
resort to outside counsel, building up substantial expertise in defending treaty claims in 
the process.81 Building up that expertise, however, takes time and may require the 
diversion of resources from other pressing legal and regulatory matters.82 Smaller, poorer 
developing nations are far less likely to have the financial or human resources to build the 
in-house capacity to defend investment treaty claims.  What’s more troubling, the efforts 
of developing nation lawyers to acquire the requisite expertise “on the job” are frustrated 
by the lack of transparency surrounding the treaty arbitration process.   
B. Lack of Transparency 
Investment treaty arbitration is characterized by a lack of transparency at every 
stage of the arbitration process.  Without the consent of the parties to the arbitration – the 
investor and the state – there is generally no public access to the pleadings, evidence, 
 
78 See Seychelles v. CDC, Part IV, infra.
79 See Argentina, Part IV, infra.
80 See Argentina, Part IV, infra.
81 See Argentina, Part IV, infra.
82 See Argentina, Part IV, infra.
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hearings, or even the tribunal award.83 This section looks at how two aspects of this 
opacity – problems with finding past arbitral awards and the lack of third party 
participation –hinder developing nations’ full participation in the arbitration process.   
1. Access to Arbitral Case Law 
Developing country counsel seeking to find relevant precedent are forced to 
engage in a kind of legal scavenger hunt through scattered and incomplete sources for 
past arbitral awards.  While there is no formal rule of precedence in investment treaty 
arbitration, lawyers and arbitrators often consider and cite prior arbitral awards as a form 
of authority when confronted with similar issues of law or fact.84 Access to this arbitral 
case law is particularly vital in a field like public international investment law where 
there are relatively few decided cases and every decision draws new lines.   
The first barrier to finding relevant precedent is a lack of public knowledge that 
an investment treaty dispute exists: of the major arbitral fora, only ICSID maintains a 
public registry of claims.85 The UNCITRAL Secretariat does not even maintain internal 
records of the cases brought under the UNCITRAL rules.86 Even when the existence of a 
claim is made public, the tribunal award may not be published.  Despite their importance 
as a source of law, none of the investment treaty arbitration fora publish awards without 
 
83 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4 ILM 524 (1965), Art. 48(5) [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (prohibiting the 
publication of an award without the consent of the parties); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art. 32(5) 
(same); see also ICSID Rules, supra note 49, Rule 32(2) (requiring consent of parties to third party 
participation in oral hearings); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule 25(4) (noting all hearings are held in camera 
unless parties agree otherwise).   
84 See David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States-
Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 679, 689 (2004) (noting that private investors and 
governments cite prior investment tribunal decisions that appear to favor them and that tribunals 
interpreting similar provisions of BITs will consider and sometimes follow the reasoning of prior awards) 
85 ICSID maintains a public registry of cases on its web-site at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm 
86 IISD, Guide, supra note 13, at 4-5. 
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the consent of both parties.87 While many awards are eventually made public by one or 
both of the parties, some nonetheless remain unpublished.88 
Meanwhile, at least some of the unpublished awards are informally traded within 
a “magic circle” of law firms and arbitrators that work in this field.89 The existence of 
these “hidden” awards provides arbitration insiders – the firms and practitioners within 
this informal professional network – with the unfair advantage of having access to a 
wider array of authority to fight and win their cases.90 At the same time, those without 
the resources to hire one of the major multinational firms are deprived of relevant 
authority to defend against investor claims.91 As outsiders, developing nations are faced 
with scattered and incomplete sources of authority, raising the difficulty and risk of 
litigating without assistance from outside counsel.   
2. Third Party Participation  
Given its origins in international commercial arbitration, it is not surprising that 
investment treaty arbitration has not traditionally welcomed the participation of outside 
parties.  Tribunal hearings under ICSID and the other arbitral institutions remain private 
unless both parties consent to the presence of a third party.92 Access to the pleadings, 
 
87 See e.g ICSID Convention, supra note 82, Art. 48(5) (prohibiting the publication of an award without the 
consent of the parties); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art. 32(5) (same).  It should be noted that ICSID 
Arbitration Rule 48(4) allows ICSID to publish excerpts from the legal holdings of awards when the 
consent of the parties cannot be obtained and the award is unavailable from another source.  However, 
these excerpts are a poor substitute for access to the full text of an award because it is often difficult to 
assess the significance of an isolated statement of the law or passage when removed from its factual 
context.  See ICSID Rules, supra note 49, Rule 48(4).   
88 Id. 
89 Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, Oil, Gas and Energy Law 
Intelligence, Volume I, Issue #02, March, 2003, at 
http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/article_56.htm  
90 Id.  
91 Peterson, BITs and Policy-Making, supra note 61, at 26. 
92 See ICSID Rules, supra note 49, Rule 32(2) (requiring consent of parties to third party participation in 
oral hearings); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule 25(4) (noting all hearings are held in camera unless parties 
agree otherwise).   
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evidence, and awards is therefore limited to the parties to the dispute.  None of the major 
arbitral institution rules explicitly allow for the submission of amicus briefs from third 
parties.  In one instance, an UNCITRAL tribunal concluded it had the authority to accept 
amicus briefs from several NGOs.93 
While greater third party participation in investment treaty arbitration has been 
justified by noting the public interest in the issues in dispute, it also has the potential to 
indirectly promote developing nations’ participation in the dispute settlement process.  As 
the Seychelles’ experience shows, we cannot assume that developing nations have access 
to the relevant legal authority and expertise necessary to mount a vigorous defense.  
Amicus briefs from NGOs and other informed parties may be able, in certain cases, to 
supplement a developing nation’s defense, ensuring that the tribunal has all of the 
relevant arguments and precedent before it to make an informed decision.       
Some have raised concerns that allowing amicus participation and access to 
hearings could overwhelm the resources of the tribunal, increasing the costs of the 
dispute and the breadth of issues that each party must address in its arguments.94 While 
these are legitimate concerns, tribunals have methods at their disposal to limit third party 
participation before it becomes too burdensome.  NAFTA tribunals, for example, 
consider a number of factors before accepting an amicus brief, including the degree to 
 
93 In Methanex v. United States, a NAFTA-based claim under UNCITRAL arbitration rules, a Canadian 
Corporation sued the United States to recover profits lost as the result a California statute banning MTBE, a 
gasoline additive shown to pollute the groundwater and linked to cancer in laboratory animals.  Three 
NGOs, two from the U.S. and one based in Canada, petitioned the tribunal for amici status to argue that the 
California ban was not tantamount to expropriation or in violation of other NAFTA investment protection 
standards.  In deciding to accept the amicus briefs, the tribunal reasoned: “There is definitely a public 
interest in this case.  The substantive issues extend far beyond those raised by the usual transnational 
arbitration between commercial parties.”  See Methanex v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as Amici Curiae, January 15, 2001 at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Methanex-AmiciCuriae.pdf    
94 See South Centre, Developments on Discussions for the Improvement of the Framework for ICSID 
Arbitration and the Participation of Developing Countries, February, 2005, para. 37, at 
http://www.southcentre.org/tadp_webpage/researchpapers_list_webpage.htm  
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which the submission would offer a perspective or knowledge on a factual or legal issue 
relevant to the arbitration that is different from the parties to the dispute, whether it 
addresses matters within the scope of the dispute, and the third party’s and public’s 
interest in the dispute.95 The prospect of a tribunal facing an overwhelming number of 
relevant third-party briefs is remote at best.  WTO panels, where amici briefs are now 
permitted, have not reported problems with an overwhelming number of amici 
submissions.96 This is unlikely because potential amici often realize that their influence 
is maximized when they unite to produce a single brief clearly stating their concerns.97 
C. Uncertainty over the Meaning of Key Treaty Standards 
Key provisions of investment treaties are often written in deliberately vague 
language in an effort to capture FDI in all its forms.  This open-ended approach can be an 
asset in a field like foreign investment where it is impossible to predict what new 
investment vehicles and structures investors will utilize in tomorrow’s business world.  
However, too much indeterminacy can be a burden for both foreign investors and States, 
who cannot anticipate how to comply with the law.   Only with the recent rise in 
investment treaty claims have tribunals begun to further define the meaning of key BIT 
standards.  Adding to the confusion, in several instances investment treaty tribunals have 
come to different conclusions over the meaning and application of these standards even 
when confronted with the same set of facts.98 
95 Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation, October 7, 2003, at 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/Nondisputing-en.pdf 
96 IISD, Comments on ICSID Discussion Paper “Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID 
Arbitration,” December, 2004, p. 9, at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_icsid_response.pdf#search=%22iisd%20%22Comments%20on%
20ICSID%20Discussion%20Paper%22%22 
97 Id.  
98 See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 37 at 1558-82. 
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While the uncertainty surrounding BIT standards affects both investors and 
States, developing nations are less well-equipped to mitigate the risks of litigating in such 
a challenging environment.  Developing nations who cannot hire outside counsel may not 
have access to the “hidden awards” and other forms of legal authority that may be able to 
provide valuable guidance on how a treaty provision has been applied in similar factual 
settings.  From a strategic point of view, the uncertainty over treaty standards may make 
developing nations more prone to settling even spurious investor claims rather than bear 
the expense of litigation and the risk of a financially devastating award.99 
IV. Tales from the Front: Developing Nation Experiences  
To date, at least 37 developing nations have faced investment treaty arbitration.100 
During research for this article, I had the privilege of interviewing current and former 
government officials in Argentina and the Republic of the Seychelles with first-hand 
experience in defending their respective countries in ICSID arbitrations.  Their stories 
reveal the difficulties developing nations may experience locating relevant precedent and 
other basic forms of legal authority.  The Seychelles’ experience101, in particular, is an 
alarming illustration of how smaller developing nations who cannot afford outside 
counsel may defend themselves without access to basic legal authority, with potentially 
disastrous results.  Taken together, these disturbing reports show that the barriers 
discussed in Part III and not merely theoretical and call for some response from the 
international community.   
 
99 See Peterson, BITs and Policy-Making, supra note 61, at 28.   
100 See supra note 55.
101 The investor claim against the Seychelles was based on a contract ICSID arbitration clause, not a 
bilateral investment treaty.  It is nevertheless relevant because the problems the Seychelles encountered in 
finding legal expertise and authority would have existed regardless of the basis for the investor claim.  In 
fact, defending a treaty-based claim is likely to be more demanding because it requires an understanding of 
current trends in public international investment law.     
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A. CDC v. Seychelles 
On August 22, 2002, the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), a 
UK-owned development finance company, lodged a Request for Arbitration with ICSID 
against the Republic of the Seychelles102 (the Republic) under a contract-based ICSID 
arbitration clause.  The request alleged the Republic had failed to honor two loan 
guarantees it had given as security for a loan to its Public Utility Corporation (PUC) to 
purchase electric generators.103 Both loan guarantees provided any dispute arising from 
the contract would be settled according to UK law.104 
CDC was represented by a team of lawyers from Allen & Overy, a major 
international law firm based in London with a specialty practice in investor-State 
arbitration.105 Seychelles was represented solely by its Attorney General, Mr. Anthony 
Fernando.106 The Republic had never been sued by a foreign investor before, and Mr. 
Fernando had no prior experience litigating ICSID or other investor-State claims.107 His 
office had an unreliable internet connection, no access to Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis, and no 
treatises on ICSID or investment arbitration.108 Though several major international law 
firms offered to represent the Republic,109 at $400-600 per hour per lawyer their fees 
would have exhausted his office budget in just weeks.110 In the end, Mr. Fernando, a 
civil law lawyer by training whose daily work typically involves criminal, constitutional, 
 
102 The Republic of the Seychelles is an Indian Ocean archipelago with a population of roughly 80,000 
located northeast of Madagascar.   
103 CDC v. Seychelles, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, December 17, 2003, at para. 7-9.  Available at: 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CDCvSeychellesAward_001.pdf [hereinafter CDC v. Seychelles, Award] 
104 Id. at para. 4. 
105 Id. at 1. 
106 Id. 
107 Telephone interview with Anthony Fernando, Attorney General of the Seychelles (Mar. 25, 2005). 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. 
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and administrative law, defended the Republic with only his wits, a copy of the ICSID 
Convention and Rules, and two outdated English contract law treatises.111 
On December 17, 2003, the tribunal, composed of a single arbitrator, found 
Seychelles had no valid defense to CDC’s default claim under UK contract law.112 In the 
award, the tribunal noted that Seychelles’ counter-memorial failed to comply with the 
tribunal’s initial directions113 and one of its principal defenses relied on a long-since 
overruled case in English contract law.114 The tribunal awarded CDC the full outstanding 
principal, interest, and eighty percent of its legal costs for a total of T2,446,701, or 
roughly $4.6 million.115 It also held that, under the terms of the 1990 and 1993 loan 
agreements, interest would continue to accrue at 9 percent per annum or a total of roughly 
$1000 per day.116 
On March 30, 2004, the Republic filed for annulment of the award under ICSID 
Article 52(1), arguing that the tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers, that it had 
seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, and that the Award failed to 
state the reasons on which it was based.117 On June 29, 2005 an Annulment Committee 
composed of three arbitrators rejected all three of the Republic’s grounds for annulment, 
concluding in harsh tones that the claim was “fundamentally lacking in merit.”118 
Despite expressing reservations about the effect that the ruling might have on the 
 
111 Id. 
112 CDC v. Seychelles, supra note 103, at para. 61.   
113 Id. at para. 26. 
114 Id. at para. 59.   
115 Id. at para. 62. 
116 Id.  
117 CDC v. Seychelles, Annulment Proceeding, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, June 29, 2005, para. 15 at 
http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CDC-Seychelles-Annulment-Decision.pdf 
118 Id. at para. 89. 
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Seychelles economy,119 the Committee awarded CDC the full costs of its counsel 
(T83,345) and held that the Republic should bear the all of the costs associated with 
ICSID and the Committee, as well as its own expenses.120 
B.  The View from Argentina 
 
Perhaps more than any other nation, Argentina understands the financial and 
administrative challenge of defending investment treaty arbitration claims.  In January of 
2002, facing an imminent default on its massive foreign debt, Argentina passed 
emergency economic legislation that, among other things, ended parity between the U.S. 
dollar and Argentine peso, converted dollar deposits and loans to pesos, and removed the 
right of public utilities to raise rates or charge in dollars.121 These measures have resulted 
in massive losses for foreign investors who hold the majority of Argentina’s public debt 
and own many of the privatized utility companies.122 In 2003 alone, 20 transnational 
corporations filed suit against Argentina alleging violations of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties.123 As of December 2004, Argentina was a defendant in an unprecedented 37 
pending investor-state arbitration claims – 32 of which are filed at ICSID – worth over 
$16 billion dollars.124 
Ignacio Suarez worked for Argentina’s Solicitor General’s office from 2000-
2003.125 He became interested in the field while completing his LLM from Harvard Law 
School and later working for a French law firm on a number of investor-state arbitration 
 
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 See Freshfields, Bruckhaus, and Deringer, “The Argentine crisis- foreign investors’ rights” January, 
2002 at http://www.freshfields.com/places/latinamerica/publications/pdfs/2431.pdf 
122 Id.  
123 See UNCTAD, Policy Implications, supra note 56, at 5.   
124 Id.  
125 Telephone Interview with Carlos Ignacio Suarez Anzorena, Latin America Specialist Advisor, Clifford 
Chance (March 23, 2005)  
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cases.126 When he started in 2000, Argentina was a defendant in only one ICSID 
proceeding and he was the sole lawyer with any experience in the investor-state 
arbitration field.127 Having come from working for a major international law firm, the 
lack of access to legal resources was a real surprise: the office did not have a subscription 
to Westlaw, Lexis-Nexis, or any of the major arbitration reporters.128  To prepare for his 
first ICSID cases, he would fly to Washington, DC three to five days before a hearing just 
so he could conduct the necessary legal research at ICSID and local law schools.129 On 
one trip, he spent over $1000 of his own money to buy hard copies of the most important 
arbitration treatises to take back to the Solicitor General’s office.130 Hiring outside 
counsel was not a viable option due to their high fees and the overriding importance that 
Argentina adopt a consistent, unified position on key issues likely to arise in all the 
arbitration cases arising out of the emergency economic measures.131 
Three years later, with the experience of litigating several ICSID cases under its 
belt, Argentina’s Solicitor General’s office looked more like an investor-State arbitration 
practice you might find at one of the major international law firms: In 2003, the office 
had at least 10 lawyers working on investment treaty arbitrations, many with substantial 
experience in international commercial litigation, degrees from top law schools, and 
ready access to all the necessary legal materials.132 Yet, even with the added legal 
 
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 Id.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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firepower, the Solicitor General’s office is overwhelmed by the unprecedented number of 
investment treaty claims filed by foreign investors.133 
V. The Solution: A Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration  
 
No system of dispute resolution is perfect.  Quite frequently, there are significant 
differences in the level of resources and legal talent available to parties in any form of 
litigation.  In the world of international commercial arbitration, the quality of each party’s 
representation is not a major concern, since the consequences are generally limited to the 
private parties involved.  However, the situation is quite different in investment treaty 
arbitration, where a state is the defendant and an adverse award has the potential to affect 
the lives of millions of citizens.  This is why it is essential that the international 
community establish some mechanism to ensure that developing nations have, at a 
minimum, affordable access to the legal authority and expertise necessary to mount a 
competent defense to investor claims.  Drawing from the success of a similar effort at the 
WTO, this Part argues for the creation of a legal assistance center (“Center”) for 
developing nations in investment treaty arbitration and reviews the spectrum of services it 
might provide.   
A. Potential Benefits of a Legal Assistance Center 
 
How would a legal assistance center for developing nations benefit the practice of 
investment treaty arbitration?  First and foremost, it would bolster the legitimacy of the 
investment treaty arbitration process by ensuring that developing nations have, at a 
minimum, access to fundamental legal authority and some basic level of legal expertise.  
Without access to these fundamental resources, a party cannot fully present its case and 
 
133 Id. 
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the tribunal is deprived of all the information it needs to make an informed and just 
ruling.  A dispute resolution process that is seen to be unfairly tilted toward investors in 
this manner undermines the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration process and 
perhaps developing nations’ willingness to enter into future BITs.    
A legal assistance center would not only promote fairness for developing nations, 
but also lead to a more efficient and effective arbitration process.  Better informed 
developing nation counsel will make more cogent legal arguments, enhancing the quality 
of the arbitration process and the ultimate result.  Developing nation counsel who 
understand the real legal issues at stake are less likely to make irrelevant or frivolous 
arguments, saving the tribunal, opposing counsel, and investors’ time and money.  For 
example, in CDC v. Seychelles, the tribunal found the Seychelles’ initial pleadings were 
confusing and failed to comply with its instructions, forcing it to grant an extension for 
clarification.134 Moreover, the tribunal strongly hinted that the Seychelles’ application 
for annulment bordered on the frivolous, reflected in its decision that the Seychelles pay 
all of the CDCs costs associated with the annulment process.135 If the Seychelles had 
access to affordable outside legal advice, it is entirely possible these costly errors could 
have been avoided.   
Even if a legal assistance center would enhance the legitimacy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of investment treaty arbitration, is it a practical or realistic proposal?  How 
should it be funded? What services should it offer?  For some guidance on these 
questions, we can look to international trade law and recent efforts to provide developing 
 
134 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.     
135 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.   
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nations with enhanced access to the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement 
process.     
B. The Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
The international community recently confronted the question of how to provide 
developing nations with effective access to international dispute mechanisms with regard 
to the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement process.  One of the developing 
nations’ chief complaints that emerged from the failed 1999 Ministerial Talks in Seattle 
was unequal access to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.136 The substance of the 
complaints related to two familiar issues: a lack of WTO trade law expertise within their 
own governments and no mechanism to help offset the prohibitive cost of obtaining 
private legal counsel.137 These charges were taken seriously because they implied the 
dispute mechanism was tilted toward wealthier developed nations, undermining a basic 
sense of fairness that is at the heart of the legitimacy of any dispute resolution 
mechanism.138 
In 1999, at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, a coalition of developed and 
developing nations139 signed the Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO 
Law (ACWL)140, which entered into force in July of 2001.  The ACWL was established 
in Geneva in July 2001 as a unique inter-governmental organization, independent of the 
 
136 John H. Jackson, Perceptions About WTO Trade Institutions, Keynote Address at the Inauguration of 
the Advisory Centre for WTO Law, Oct. 5, 2001 at http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news_e.aspx 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Founding members of the ACWL include: Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, the United 
Kingdom, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.   
140 Advisory Centre on WTO Law, The Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law at:
http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/doc_e.aspx [hereinafter Advisory Centre Agreement] 
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WTO.141 It is funded and controlled by the developed and developing countries that co-
own and co-administer it.142 
The purpose of the ACWL is to “provide legal training, support and advice on 
WTO law and dispute settlement procedures to developing countries.”143 The Centre 
offers members three principal services for free or at subsidized rates: 
1) legal advice on WTO law, including the compatibility of proposed legislation 
and government measures; 
 
2) support to parties in WTO dispute settlement proceedings; 
3) and training of government officials in WTO law through seminars and 
internships.144 
Membership in the ACWL is open to both developing and developed nations.145 
However, the services of the Centre are only available to developing nations, economies 
in transition, and least-developed countries.  The Centre’s fee structure seeks to promote 
membership in the ACWL, while maintaining access for the poorest nations regardless of 
membership.  Membership incentives include discounts on services and a higher priority 
access when the Centre is asked to assist multiple parties in a dispute.  Fees for services 
rendered in dispute settlement proceedings are billed at hourly rates on a sliding scale 
based on the country’s share of world trade and GDP, with least developed nations billed 
at only $25 per hour.146 ACWL members and all least developed countries receive free 
legal advice on WTO law up to a set number of maximum hours determined by the 
 
141 See ACWL, About Us-Introduction, at http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/about_e.aspx 
142 Id. 
143 Advisory Centre Agreement, supra note 140, Art. 2(1). 
144 See ACWL, Introduction to Legal Advice, at http://www.acwl.ch/e/legal/legal_e.aspx 
145 As of May 2005, the Centre has 37 Members: 10 developed country members, and 27 members entitled 
to the services of the ACWL. 
146 See ACWL, Financial Aspects, at: http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/financial_e.aspx 
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Management Board.147 The Centre maintains a roster of external counsel148 for referrals 
at points when demand for its services is too high, a conflict of interest exists, or it lacks 
the necessary expertise in a highly technical case.149 The current staff of the Centre 
consists of an Executive Director, Deputy Director, six lawyers, and two support staff.150 
C.  A Proposed Legal Assistance Center 
To be effective, a legal assistance center does not need to rival the resources, 
expertise, or services of the major international law firms.  Instead, it should aim to 
provide developing nations with high-quality information, legal advice, and training on 
an affordable basis.  In this manner, the Center will fill a niche by providing developing 
nations with an option between the risk of relying solely on an in-house defense and the 
expense of hiring outside counsel.    
1. Services 
The shape and size of a legal assistance center would of course depend, in part, on 
the type of services it offers developing nations.  A legal assistance center could offer 
developing nations a spectrum of services, including: 1) a repository for access to all 
relevant legal authority; 2) training to enhance the capacity of developing nations to 
negotiate future BITs and defend themselves against investor claims; 3) legal advice or 
representation on a range of matters, including the compatibility of proposed legislation 
with BIT obligations and assistance in defending actual investor claims.  A closer look at 
each of these potential services will help clarify their relative costs and purpose. 
 
147 See ACWL, Annex IV of the Agreement Establishing the Centre, Schedule of Fees for Services 
Rendered by the Centre, at http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/doc_e.aspx  
148 See ACWL, Roster of External Legal Counsel, at http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/doc_e.aspx 
149 See Friedrich Roessler, Executive Director of the ACWL, Speech Delivered at Inauguration of the 
ACWL (Oct. 5, 2001) at http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news_detailsphoto_e.aspx?id=7e0114b4-1819-45ab-
9cce-494179ace633 
150 See ACWL, About Staff, at: http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/staff_e.aspx 
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i. Repository for legal authority 
At a minimum, a legal assistance center should serve as a repository for relevant 
legal authority, including published and unpublished tribunal awards, arbitration treatises 
and journals, and other academic commentary.  A facility like this could serve as a “one-
stop” library for developing nations, greatly simplifying the task of finding relevant legal 
authority and ensuring, at a minimum, that all parties have access to basic legal authority.  
Library staff might also maintain a list of qualified counsel who have expressed an 
interest in assisting developing nations on a pro-bono basis or at a reduced rate.   
ii. Training to enhance capacity 
A long term goal of a legal assistance center should be to build developing 
nations’ in-house capacity to negotiate BITs and defend investment treaty claims.  The 
potential benefits of training programs are twofold:  First, they will allow developing 
nation counsel to develop at least some expertise with emerging developments in public 
international investment law and the relevant arbitration rules.  Secondly, they will 
provide a forum where developing nation counsel can share experiences and strengthen 
professional relationships with Center staff.  In this manner, training will serve a 
preventative function, ensuring that developing nations are not totally unfamiliar with 
treaty arbitration and can make informed decisions on whether they should settle or 
litigate an investor claim.   
There appears to be great demand for training programs from developing nations 
who have faced investment treaty claims.  UNCTAD, together with Organization of 
American States and the Canadian Agency for International Development, recently held a 
seminar on managing investment disputes in Washington, DC, for several countries from 
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Latin America who are facing investment treaty claims.151 The course examined the 
substantive treaty-based standards that give rise to most investment treaty disputes, as 
well as key jurisdictional concepts, through case studies and insights from experienced 
arbitration practitioners.  The course was well-received, with participants from Central 
America calling upon the UNCTAD Secretariat to set up a facility to assist in the actual 
management of investor-state disputes for the region, through capacity-building, supply 
of information and research, and institutional support.152 The legal assistance center 
could build on this success, partnering with UNCTAD and other organizations to 
organize future training sessions.   
A legal assistance center also might consider paid internships as an innovative 
way to provide developing nation lawyers with invaluable practical experience in the 
investment treaty arbitration process.  The ACWL recently launched a Secondment 
Programme for Trade Lawyers, a program where government trade lawyers from least-
developed countries and eligible ACWL Members join the staff of the ACWL as paid 
trainees for a period of nine months.153 The Programme aims to provide the participants 
with both theoretical training and practical experience in WTO law and an opportunity to 
participate actively in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.154 There has been an 
 
151 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Advanced Seminar of Managing 
Investment Disputes,” Final Report (November 3-11, 2005) at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs//dite_pcbb_ias42_en.pdf 
152 Id. at p. 3.   
153 See ACWL, Secondment Programme for Trade Lawyers at 
http://www.acwl.ch/e/pdf/secondment_programme_05.pdf 
154 Id. 
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overwhelming response to the program, with 52 applications received from ACWL 
members and LDC non-members.155 
iii. Legal Representation   
 Access to legal authority is an important first step, but legal expertise is required 
to interpret that authority and marshal the relevant facts into an effective defense.  
Likewise, training programs can be an effective way to build long term capacity, but they 
are no substitute for actual legal assistance in defending a concrete, pending investor 
claim.   Developing nations with no prior experience in investment treaty arbitration or 
the means to afford outside counsel may need some form of subsidized legal 
representation to effectively defend an actual investor claim.  A legal assistance center 
has several options to provide developing nations with access to affordable legal 
expertise.        
As a first step, the Center could provide developing nations with forms of legal 
advice short of full representation.  For example, the Center could offer legal opinions on 
the text of a proposed BIT, the compatibility of a proposed law with a current investment 
treaty, or a preliminary analysis of the merits of a potential investor claim.  With the 
uncertainty surrounding the meaning of key investment treaty provisions, developing 
nations may need assistance in clarifying whether proposed or current government 
measures may expose them to liability.  Likewise, the Center might offer expert legal 
opinions on proposed treaty language to ensure that developing nations are aware of the 
full implications of specific treaty provisions.  In this manner, the Center will serve an 
important preventative function, allowing developing nations to steer clear of disputes in 
 
155 See ACWL, News, “LDCs and ACWL Members respond positively to launch of Secondment 
Programme for Trade Lawyers,” at http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news_detailsphoto_e.aspx?id=cd657f31-
5594-47f4-a9a7-937a354cba49 
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the first place rather than litigating after the fact.  A similar service offered by the ACWL 
has been used extensively by member nations.156 In the same vein, the Center could offer 
a preliminary analysis of the legal merits of an investor’s claim at the outset of a dispute, 
allowing developing nations to make an informed decision whether to settle or hire 
outside counsel.   
At the most ambitious end of the spectrum, the Legal assistance center could 
provide developing nations with direct legal representation during the arbitration 
proceedings.  Borrowing from the successful ACWL dispute settlement assistance 
program,157 lawyers from the Center could work alongside developing nation counsel on 
everything from drafting effective pleadings to presenting oral arguments before the 
tribunal.  The involvement of Center staff would vary with the needs of each client, but 
always seek to merely assist developing nation counsel as opposed to replacing them 
during the proceedings.  Offering this kind of full, direct legal representation would 
provide developing nations with a true low-cost alternative to hiring one of the major 
international firms.  However, it would also be very resource intensive, limiting the 
number of clients the Center could realistically serve at any given time.   
2. Location 
At first glance, the most obvious location forthe Center might appear to be ICSID, 
the institution that facilitates the majority of investment treaty arbitrations.  As a World 
Bank institution, ICSID already has a development orientation and a talented, 
 
156 ACWL members have made liberal use of the Centre’s legal opinions on compatibility of government 
measures with WTO law, with over 50 requests since 2001.  See ACWL, Legal Advice Provided Since 
2001 at http://www.acwl.ch/e/legal/legal_advice_e.aspx 
157 The ACWL has provided direct legal representation to developing nations in at least 14 different WTO 
disputes, at both the Panel and Appellate level.  See ACWL, Dispute Settlement, at 
http://www.acwl.ch/e/dispute/dispute_e.aspx 
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multilingual staff of lawyers and support personnel familiar with investment treaty 
arbitration.  However, ICSID is not well-suited to play host to a legal assistance center 
due to limitations related to its core mission as a neutral dispute settlement facility: 
investors would question its objectivity and developing nations would be unlikely to seek 
advice from an institution whose core mission prevents it from being an advocate for 
their interests.  Due to these limitations, it is difficult to see ICSID hosting anything more 
ambitious than a repository for legal authority or perhaps a legal referral center.   
A different, more plausible home for the Center is with the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  Established in 1964, UNCTAD 
promotes the development-friendly integration of developing countries into the world 
economy.158 UNCTAD already sponsors seminars for developing nations on effective 
BIT negotiation tactics, the management of investment treaty arbitration disputes, and an 
on-line guide to ICSID arbitration.159 However, UNCTAD has some limitations of its 
own.  As a United Nations organization, it may be susceptible to political pressure from 
the wealthier nations who fund most of its programs.  Hosting a legal assistance center 
that provides direct legal representation to developing nations may attract opposition 
from developed nations if they perceive it as a threat to their investors. 
Rather than seeking to fit within another organization’s mandate, a legal 
assistance center could be created as a wholly new, independent inter-governmental 
institution.  Of course, this would require leadership in getting the organization off the 
ground and locating sources of funding.  Financial support from sympathetic industrial 
 
158 See UNCTAD, About UNCTAD at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1530&lang=1 
159 See UNCTAD, Course on Dispute Settlement at 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2102&lang=1 
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nations and private foundations may be necessary to raise the initial pool of capital 
needed to launch the Center and sustain it during its first years.160 Sustaining the Center 
over the long term will likely require some combination of grants, fees for legal services, 
and possibly membership contributions.  The Centre might consider soliciting donations 
for an endowment to ensure its long-term financial stability and independence.161 
Conclusion   
 Even as the popularity of investment treaty arbitration has grown, its legitimacy is 
threatened by reports from developing nations of a lack of affordable access to the legal 
authority and expertise needed to defend investor claims.  Due to a lack of relevant legal 
expertise within their own government ministries, many developing nations are forced to 
hire one of a handful of international law firms at a cost of millions per year.  Meanwhile, 
those who cannot afford outside counsel face scattered, incomplete sources of precedent 
and nowhere to turn for affordable legal assistance.  Given that even a single lost claim 
could wreak havoc on a developing nation’s economy, something must be done to fill this 
void in legal services.  A legal assistance center would bolster the legitimacy of 
investment treaty arbitration by providing developing nations with an alternative, low-
cost option for obtaining legal assistance.  Better prepared developing nation counsel will 
make more cogent legal arguments, allowing the tribunal to clearly identify the issues in 
the case and produce a well-informed award.  By ensuring that developing nations have 
affordable access to legal authority and expertise, investment treaty arbitration will more 
 
160 The financial support of the 9 developed nations who signed the “Agreement establishing the Advisory 
Centre on WTO Law” was critical to creating the $8 million fund used to launch the ACWL.  See Andrea 
Greisberger, Enhancing the Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization: Why the United States and 
European Union Should Support the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 37 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 827, 840 
(2004). 
161 Part of the ACWL annual operating budget comes from its $20 million endowment created through 
donations by founding member-States.  Id.  
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perfectly fulfill its mission of providing a truly neutral and just form of dispute 
settlement.   
 
